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1. Introduction
Banking supervisors, after many painful experiences, are quite con-
vinced that banks’ lending mistakes are more prevalent during
upturns than in the midst of a recession.1 In good times both bor-
rowers and lenders are overconﬁdent about investment projects and
their ability to repay and to recoup their loans and the corresponding
fees and interest rates. Banks’ overoptimism about borrowers’ future
prospects, coupled with strong balance sheets (i.e., capital well above
minimum requirements) and increasing competition, brings about
more liberal credit policies with lower credit standards.2 Thus, banks
sometimes ﬁnance negative net present value (NPV) projects only to
ﬁnd later that the loan becomes impaired or the borrower defaults.
On the other hand, during recessions—when banks are ﬂooded with
nonperforming loans, high speciﬁc provisions, and tighter capital
buﬀers—banks suddenly turn very conservative and tighten credit
standards well beyond positive net present values. Only their best
borrowers get new funds; thus, lending during downturns is safer
and credit policy mistakes much lower. Across many jurisdictions
and at diﬀerent points in time, bank managers seem to overweight
concerns regarding type 1 lending policy errors (i.e., good borrowers
not getting a loan) during economic booms and underweight type 2
errors (i.e., bad borrowers getting ﬁnanced). The opposite happens
during recessions.
Several explanations have appeared in the literature to rational-
ize ﬂuctuations in credit policies. First of all, the classic principal-
agency problem between bank shareholders and managers can feed
excessive volatility into loan growth rates. Once managers obtain a
reasonable return on equity for their shareholders, they may engage
in other activities that depart from the ﬁrm’s value maximization
and focus more on their own rewards. One of these activities might
be excessive credit growth in order to increase the social presence
of the bank (and its managers) or the power of managers in a con-
tinuously enlarging organization (Williamson 1963). If managers are
1See, for instance, Caruana (2002), Ferguson (2004), and the numerous joint
announcements by U.S. bank regulators in the late nineties warning U.S. banks
to tighten credit standards.
2A loose monetary policy can also contribute to overoptimism through excess
liquidity provision.
Vol. 2 No. 2 Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation 67
rewarded more in terms of growth objectives instead of proﬁtability
targets, incentives to rapid growth may result. This has been doc-
umented previously by the expense preference literature and, more
recently, by the literature that relates risk and managers’ incentives.3
Strong competition among banks or between banks and other
ﬁnancial intermediaries erodes margins as both loan and deposit
interest rates get closer to the interbank rate. To compensate for
the fall in proﬁtability, bank managers might increase loan growth
at the expense of the (future) quality of their loan portfolios. Excess
capacity in the banking industry is being built up. Nevertheless, that
will not impact immediately on problem loans, so it might encourage
further loan growth.
In a more formalized framework, Van den Heuvel (2002) shows
that the combination of risk-based capital requirements, an imper-
fect market for bank equity, and a maturity mismatch in banks’
balance sheets gives rise to a bank capital channel of monetary pol-
icy. In boom periods, when banks show strong balance sheets and
capital buﬀers, they overlend. However, as the expansion heads to
its end, the surge in loan portfolios has eroded much of the capital
buﬀer; at that point, a monetary shock may trigger a decline in bank
proﬁts, stringent capital ratios, and a tightening of lending standards
and, subsequently, of loans available to ﬁrms and households.4
Herd behavior (Rajan 1994) might also help to explain why bank
managers ﬁnance negative NPV projects during expansions. Credit
mistakes are judged more leniently if they are common to the whole
industry. Moreover, a manager whose bank systematically loses mar-
ket share and underperforms its competitors in terms of earnings
growth increases his or her probability of being ﬁred. Thus, managers
have a strong incentive to behave as their peers, which, at an aggre-
gate level, enhances lending booms and recessions. Short-term objec-
tives are prevalent and might explain why banks ﬁnance projects
during expansions that, later on, will become nonperforming loans.
Berger and Udell (2004) have developed the so-called institu-
tional memory hypothesis in order to explain the markedly cyclical
3For the former, see (among others) Edwards (1977), Hannan and Mavinga
(1980), Akella and Greenbaum (1988), and Mester (1989). For the latter, see
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995), and Esty (1997).
4Ayuso, Pe´rez, and Saurina (2004) ﬁnd evidence of this cyclical behavior of
capital buﬀers.
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proﬁle of loans and nonperforming loan losses. It states that as time
passes since the last loan bust, loan oﬃcers become less and less
skilled to grant loans to high-risk borrowers. That might be the
result of two complementary forces. First, the proportion of loan
oﬃcers that experienced the last bust decreases as the bank hires
new, younger employees and the former ones retire. Thus, there is a
loss of learning experience. Second, some of the experienced oﬃcers
may forget the lessons of the past, especially as more years go by
and the former recession becomes a more distant memory.5
Finally, collateral might also play a role in fueling credit cycles.
Usually, loan booms are intertwined with asset booms.6 Rapid
increases in land, house, or share prices increase the availability of
funds for those who can pledge such assets as collateral. At the same
time, the bank is more willing to lend since it has an (increasingly
worthier) asset to back the loan in case of trouble. On the other hand,
it could be possible that the widespread conﬁdence among bankers
results in a decline in credit standards, including the need to pledge
collateral. Collateral, as risk premium, can be thought to be a signal
of the degree of tightening of individual bank loan policies.7
Despite the theoretical developments and the banking supervi-
sors’ experiences, the empirical literature providing evidence of the
link between rapid credit growth and loan losses is scant.8 In this
paper we produce clear evidence of a direct, although lagged, rela-
tionship between credit cycle and credit risk.9 A rapid increase in
loan portfolios is positively associated with an increase in nonper-
forming loan ratios later on. Moreover, those loans granted during
5Kindleberger (1978) contains the idea of fading bad experiences among eco-
nomic agents.
6See Borio and Lowe (2002), Davis and Zhu (2004), and Goodhart, Hofmann,
and Segoviano (2005).
7The Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices shows the cyclical nature of bank lending standards, loan
demand, and loan spreads. Asea and Blomberg (1998) ﬁnd, with bank-level vari-
ables, that the probability of collateralization increases during contractions and
decreases during expansions in the United States.
8Clair (1992), Keeton (1999), and Salas and Saurina (2002) are a few excep-
tions.
9Goodhart, Hofmann, and Segoviano (2005) document that credit over GDP
is a good predictor of future defaults. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (forthcoming)
predict that episodes of ﬁnancial distress are more likely in the aftermath of
periods of strong credit expansion.
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boom periods have a higher probability of default than those granted
during periods of slow credit growth. To our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst time that such an empirical study, based on loan-by-loan infor-
mation, relating credit-cycle phase and future problem loans is being
carried out. Finally, we show that in boom periods collateral require-
ments are relaxed, while the opposite happens in recessions, which
we take as evidence of looser credit standards during expansions.
The three empirical avenues provide similar results: In boom
periods, when lending accelerates, the seeds for problem loans are
being sown. During recession periods, when banks curtail credit
growth, they become much more cautious, both in terms of the
quality of the borrowers and the loan conditions. Therefore, bank-
ing supervisors’ concerns are well rooted both in theoretical and
empirical grounds and deserve careful scrutiny and a proper answer
by regulators. We call the former ﬁndings procyclicality of ex ante
credit risk, as opposed to the behavior of ex post credit risk (i.e.,
nonperforming loans), which increases during recessions and declines
in good periods.10 The issue here is to realize that lending policy
mistakes occur in good times; thus, a prudential response from the
supervisor might be needed at those times.
We develop a new regulatory devise speciﬁcally designed to
cope with procyclicality of ex ante credit risk. It is a countercycli-
cal, or forward-looking, loan loss provision that takes into account
the former empirical results. Spain already had a dynamic provi-
sion (the so-called statistical provision) with a clear prudential bias
(Ferna´ndez de Lis, Mart´ınez Page´s, and Saurina 2000). The main
criticism to that provision (coming from accountants, not from bank-
ing supervisors) was that resulting total loan loss provisions were
excessively “ﬂat” through an entire economic cycle. Although it
shares the prudential concern of the statistical provision, the new
proposal does not achieve, by construction, a ﬂat loan loss provision
through the cycle. Instead, total loan loss provisions are still higher
in recessions, but they are also signiﬁcant when credit policies are the
most lax and therefore credit risk (according to supervisors’ expe-
riences and our empirical ﬁndings) is entering at a high speed on
bank loan portfolios. By making a concrete proposal, we would like
10A thorough discussion of banking regulatory tools to cope with procyclicality
of the ﬁnancial system is in Borio, Furﬁne, and Lowe (2001).
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to open a debate on banking regulatory tools that can contribute to
dampen business-cycle ﬂuctuations and, thus, to enhance ﬁnancial
stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
the empirical evidence on credit cycles and credit risk. Section 3
explains the rationale and workings of the new regulatory tool
through a simulation exercise. Section 4 contains a policy discussion,
and section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical Evidence on Lending Cycles and
Credit Risk
2.1 Problem Loan Ratios and Credit Growth
Salas and Saurina (2002) model problem loan ratios as a function of
both macro- and microvariables (i.e., bank balance sheet variables).
They ﬁnd that lagged credit growth has a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on ex post credit risk measures. Here, we follow that paper in
order to disentangle the relationship between past credit growth and
current problem loans. Although in spirit the methodology is simi-
lar, there are some important diﬀerences worth pointing out. First
of all, we use a longer period, which allows us to consider two lend-
ing cycles of the Spanish economy. Secondly, we focus more on loan
portfolio characteristics (industry and regional concentration and
importance of collateralized loans) of the bank rather than on bal-
ance sheet variables, which are much more general and diﬃcult to
interpret. For that, we take advantage of the information contained
in the Central Credit Register (CCR) database run by Banco de
Espan˜a.11 The equation we estimate is the following:
NPLit = αNPLit−1 + β1GDPGt + β2GDPGt−1 + β3RIRt
+β4RIRt−1 + δ1LOANGit−2 + δ2LOANGit−3
+ δ4LOANGit−4 + χ1HERFRit + χ2HERFIit
+φ1COLINDit + φ2COLFIRit + ωSIZEit + ηi + εit, (1)
11Any loan above e6,000 granted by any bank operating in Spain must be
reported to the CCR. A detailed description of the CCR content can be found in
Jime´nez and Saurina (2004) and Jime´nez, Salas, and Saurina (forthcoming).
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where NPLit is the ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans
for bank i in year t. In fact, we estimate the logarithmic transfor-
mation of that ratio (i.e., ln(NPLit/(100 − NPLit))) in order to not
curtail the range of variation of the endogenous variable. Since prob-
lem loans present a lot of persistence, we include the left-hand-side
variable in the right-hand side lagged one year. We control for the
macroeconomic determinants of credit risk (i.e., common shocks to
all banks) through the real rate of growth of the gross domestic
product (GDPG) and the real interest rate (RIR), proxied as the
interbank interest rate less the inﬂation of the period. Both vari-
ables are included contemporaneously as well as lagged one year
since some of the impacts might take some time to appear.
Our variable of interest is the loan growth rate, lagged two, three,
and four years. A positive and signiﬁcant parameter for those vari-
ables will be empirical evidence supporting the prudential concerns
of banking regulators since the swifter the loan growth, the higher
the problem loans in the future.
Moreover, we control for risk-diversiﬁcation strategies of each
bank through the inclusion of two Herﬁndahl indexes (one for region,
HERFR, and the other for industry, HERFI ). We also include as
a control variable the size of the bank (SIZE )—that is, the market
share of the bank in each period of time. Equation (1) also takes into
account the specialization of the bank in collateralized loans, distin-
guishing between those of ﬁrms (COLFIR) and those of households
(COLIND).
Finally, ηi is a bank ﬁxed eﬀect to control for idiosyncratic char-
acteristics of each bank, constant along time. It might reﬂect the
risk proﬁle of the bank, the way of doing business, etc. εit is a ran-
dom error. We estimate model 1 in ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to pre-
vent from biasing the results due to a possible correlation between
unobservable bank characteristics and some of the right-hand-side
variables. Given that some of the explanatory variables might be
determined at the same time as the left-hand-side variable, we use
a GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991).
All the information from each individual bank comes from the
CCR. Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables.
The period analyzed covers two credit cycles of the Spanish bank-
ing sector (from 1984 to 2002), with an aggregate maximum for
NPL around 1985 and, again, in 1993. We focus on commercial
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
NPLit 3.94 5.70 0.00 99.90
GDPGt 2.90 1.51 −1.03 4.83
RIRt 4.14 2.90 −0.67 8.12
LOANGi,t−2 17.36 14.37 −17.29 71.97
LOANGi,t−3 17.37 13.93 −13.80 67.82
LOANGi,t−4 17.54 14.09 −11.10 64.68
HERFRit 52.68 24.86 11.26 98.87
HERFI it 18.47 9.82 7.45 70.26
COLIND it 19.25 16.28 0.00 69.91
COLFIRit 20.47 12.89 0.00 70.35
SIZE it 0.59 1.05 0.00 8.79
Note: NPLit is the nonperforming loan ratio—that is, the quotient between
nonperforming loans and total loans. GDPGt is the real rate of growth of gross
domestic product. RIRt is the real interest rate, calculated as the interbank
interest rate less the inﬂation of the period. LOANG it is the rate of the growth
of loans for bank i. HERFRit is the Herﬁndahl index of bank i in terms of
the amount lent to each region. HERFI it is the Herﬁndahl index of bank i in
terms of the amount lent to each industry. COLIND it is the percentage of fully
collateralized loans to households over total loans for bank i. COLFIRit is the
percentage of fully collateralized loans to ﬁrms over total loans for bank i.
SIZE it is the market share of bank i. All variables are shown in percentage
points. i denotes the bank and t denotes the year.
and savings banks, which represent more than 95 percent of total
assets among credit institutions (only small credit cooperatives and
specialized ﬁnancial ﬁrms are left aside). Some outliers have been
eliminated in order to avoid the possibility that a small number of
observations, with a very low relative weight over the total sample,
could bias the results. Thus, we have eliminated those extreme loan
growth rates (i.e., banks with a loan growth rate lower or higher
than the 5th and 95th percentile, respectively).
Results appear in the ﬁrst column of table 2 (labeled “Model 1”).
As expected, since we take ﬁrst diﬀerences of equation (1) and
εit is white noise, there is ﬁrst-order residual autocorrelation and
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not second order. A Sargan test of validity of instruments is
also fully satisfactory. The results of the estimation are robust to
heteroskedasticity.
Regarding the explanatory variables, there is persistence in the
NPL variable. The macroeconomic control variables are both signif-
icant and have the expected signs. Thus, the acceleration of GDP,
as well as a decline in real interest rates, brings about a decline in
problem loans. The impact of interest rates is much more rapid than
that of economic activity. The more concentrated the credit port-
folio in a region, the higher the problem loan ratio, while industry
concentration is not signiﬁcant. Collateralized loans to households
are less risky (10 percent level of signiﬁcance), mainly because these
are mortgages that, in Spain, have the lowest credit risk. The para-
meter of the collateralized loans to ﬁrms, although positive, is not
signiﬁcant. The size of the bank does not have a signiﬁcant impact
on the problem loan ratio.
Finally, regarding the variables that are the focus of our paper,
the rate of loan growth lagged four years is positive and signiﬁcant
(at the 1 percent level). The loan growth rate lagged three years is
also positive, although not signiﬁcant. Therefore, rapid credit growth
today results in lower credit standards that, eventually, bring about
higher problem loans.
The economic impact of the explanatory variables is signiﬁcant.
The long-run elasticity of GDP growth rate, evaluated at the mean
of the variables, is −1.19; that is, an increase of 1 percentage point in
the rate of GDP growth (i.e., GDP grows at 3 percent instead of at
2 percent) decreases the NPL ratio by 30.1 percent (i.e., it declines
from 3.94 percent to 2.75 percent). For interest rates, a 100-basis-
point increase brings about a rise in the NPL ratio of 21.6 percent.
Regarding loan growth rates, an acceleration of 1 percent in the
growth rate has a long-term impact of a 0.7 percent higher problem
loan ratio.
We have performed numerous robustness tests. Model 2 (the
second column of table 2) tests for the asymmetric impact of loan
expansions and contractions. We augment model 1 with the absolute
value of the diﬀerence between the loan credit growth of bank i in
year t and its average over time. All model 1 results hold, but it can
be seen that there is some asymmetry: rapid credit growth of a bank
(i.e., above its own average loan growth) increases nonperforming
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loans, while slow growth (i.e., below average) has no signiﬁcant
impact on problem loans.12 If instead of focusing on credit growth
of bank i (either alone or compared to its average growth rate over
time), we look at the relative position of bank i in respect to the rest
of the banks at a point in time (i.e., at each year t), we ﬁnd that the
relative loan growth rate lagged four years still has a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on bank i’s NPL ratio (model 3, third column of
table 2). The parameter of relative credit growth lagged three years
is positive but not signiﬁcant. The rest of the variables keep their
sign and signiﬁcance. Model 4 (the last column of table 2) shows
that there is asymmetry in the response of nonperforming loans to
credit growth. When banks expand their loan portfolios at a speed
above the average of the banking sector, future nonperforming loans
increase, while there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect if the loan growth is below
the average.13 Finally, the former results are robust to changes in
the macroeconomic control variables (not shown). If we substitute
time dummies for the change in the GDP growth rate and for the
real interest rate, the loan growth rate is still positive and signiﬁ-
cant in lag 4 (although at the 10 percent level) and, again, positive
(although not signiﬁcant) in lag 3.
All in all, we ﬁnd a robust statistical relationship between rapid
credit growth at each bank portfolio and problem loans later on.
The lag is around four years, so bank managers and short-term
investors (including shareholders) might have incentives to foster
credit growth today in order to reap short-term beneﬁts to the
expense of long-term bank stakeholders, including depositors, the
deposit guarantee fund, and banking supervisors.
2.2 Probability of Default and Credit Growth
Instead of focusing on bank-aggregated-level credit risk measures, in
this section we analyze the probability of default at an individual
12Note that in model 1, regression results are the same for the variable rate of
growth of loans in bank i at year t as they are for the diﬀerence between the for-
mer variable and the average rate of growth of loans of bank i along time. That is
because the latter term is constant over time for each bank and disappears when
we take ﬁrst diﬀerences in equation (1).
13Note that the relevant test here is to test if α + β (and α − β) is signiﬁcant,
not each of them alone.
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loan level and its relation to the cyclical position of the bank credit
policy. The hypothesis is that, for the reasons explained in section 1
above, those loans granted during credit booms are riskier than those
granted when the bank is reining in loan growth. That would pro-
vide a rigorous empirical microfoundation for prudential regulatory
devises aimed at covering the losses embedded in policies regarding
rapid credit growth.
In order to test the former hypothesis, we use individual loan
data from the CCR. We focus on new loans granted to nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms with a maturity larger than one year and keep track of them
the following years. We study only ﬁnancial loans (i.e., excluding
receivables, leasing, etc.), which are 60 percent of the total loans to
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in the CCR, granted by commercial and savings
banks. The equation estimated is
Pr(DEFAULTijt+k = 1) = F (θ + α(LOANGit − averageLOANGi)
+β
∣∣LOANGit − averageLOANGi∣∣χLOANCHARiit
+ δ1DREGi + δ2DINDi + δ3BANKCHARit + ϕt + ηi), (2)
where we model the probability of default of loan j, in bank i, some
k years after being granted (i.e., at t+2, t+3, and t+4)14 as a logis-
tic function [F (x) = 1/(1 + exp(−x))] of the characteristics of that
loan (LOANCHAR), such as its size, maturity (i.e., between one
and three years and more than three years), and collateral (fully
collateralized or no collateral); a set of control variables (i.e., the
region where the ﬁrm operates, DREG, and the industry to which
the borrower pertains, DIND); and the characteristics of the bank
that grants the loan (BANKCHAR), such as its size and type (i.e.,
commercial or savings bank). We also control for macroeconomic
characteristics, including time dummies (ϕt).
We do not consider default immediately after the loan is granted
(i.e., in t + 1) because it takes time for a bad borrower to reveal as
14We consider that a loan is in default when its doubtful part is larger than
the 5 percent of its total amount. Thus, we exclude from default small arrears,
mainly technical, that are sorted out by borrowers in a few days and that, usually,
never reach the following month. The level and the evolution of the probability
of default (PD) across time and ﬁrm size in Spain can be seen in Saurina and
Trucharte (2004). On average, large ﬁrms (i.e., those with annual sales above
e50 million) have a PD between four and ﬁve times lower than that of small and
medium-sized enterprises (i.e., ﬁrms with annual turnover below e50 million).
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such. When granted a loan, a borrower takes the money from the
bank and invests it into the project. As the project develops, the
borrower is either able to repay the loan and the due interest pay-
ments or is not able to pay and defaults. Therefore, it takes time for
the default to occur.
Once we have controlled for loan, bank, and time characteris-
tics, we add the relative loan growth rate of bank i at time t with
respect to ﬁnancial loans granted to nonﬁnancial ﬁrms (LOANGit −
averageLOANGi)—that is, the current lending position of each bank
in comparison to its average loan growth. If α is positive and sig-
niﬁcant, we interpret this as a signal of more credit risk in boom
periods when, probably, credit standards are low. On the contrary,
when credit growth slows, banks become much more careful in scru-
tinizing loan applications; as a result, next-year defaults decrease sig-
niﬁcantly. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that such a direct
test has been run. Additionally, we test for asymmetries in that rela-
tionship, as in the previous section. We have considered only those
banks with a loan growth rate within the 5th and 95th percentile,
to eliminate outliers.
It is very important to control for the great heterogeneity due to
ﬁrm eﬀects, even more because our database does not contain ﬁrm-
related variables (i.e., balance sheet and proﬁt and loss variables).
For this reason, we have controlled for ﬁrm (loan) characteristics
using a random eﬀects model, which allows us to take into account
the unobserved heterogeneity (without limiting the sample as the
conditional model does) assuming a zero correlation between the
ﬁrm eﬀects and the rest of the characteristics of the ﬁrm.15
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the pool of all loans
granted. We observe that the faster the growth rate of the bank, the
higher the likelihood to default in the following years. We observe
that α is positive and signiﬁcant when we consider defaults three
and four years later, and α is positive, although not signiﬁcant, for
defaults two years after the loan was granted (table 3, columns 1,
3, and 5). As mentioned before, although not reported in table 3,
we control for macroeconomic characteristics, region and industry
15We have also estimated a logit model with ﬁxed eﬀects, and the results are
quite similar.
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Table 3. GMM Estimation Results of Equation (2) Using
a Random Eﬀect Logit Model (Results for Pool of All
Loans Granted)
(1) (2)
Variables Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Dependent Variable DEFAULTijt+2 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+2 (0/1)
Bank Characteristics
LOANGit − AVERAGE
LOANGi (α) 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001*
|LOANGit − AVERAGE
LOANGi (β) — — 0.005 0.001***
Province Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,823,656 1,823,656
Time Period 1985–2004 1985–2004
Wald Test [χ(2)]/p-value 8,959 0.00 9,121 0.00
Test Asymmetric Impact
(p-value)
α + β = 0 — 0.00
α − β = 0 — 0.00
(3) (4)
Variables Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Dependent Variable DEFAULTijt+3 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+3 (0/1)
Bank Characteristics
LOANGit − AVERAGE
LOANGi (α) 0.002 0.001*** 0.001 0.001
|LOANGit − AVERAGE
LOANGi| (β) — — 0.001 0.001
Province Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,643,708 1,643,708
Time Period 1985–2004 1985–2004
Wald Test [χ(2)]/p-value 4,800 0.00 4,874 0.00
Test Asymmetric Impact
(p-value)
α + β = 0 — 0.00
α − β = 0 — 0.93
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued). GMM Estimation Results of
Equation (2) Using a Random Eﬀect Logit Model
(Results for Pool of All Loans Granted)
(5) (6)
Variables Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Dependent Variable DEFAULTijt+4 (0/1) DEFAULTijt+4 (0/1)
Bank Characteristics
LOANGit − AVERAGE 0.002 0.001** 0.002 0.002
LOANGi (α)
|LOANGit − AVERAGE — — 0.000 0.002
LOANGi| (β)
Province Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,433,074 1,433,074
Time Period 1985–2004 1985–2004
Wald Test [χ(2)]/p-value 2,992 0.00 3,054
Test Asymmetric Impact
(p-value)
α + β = 0 — 0.04
α − β = 0 — 0.55
Note: DEFAULT is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the loan is doubtful and 0 other-
wise. LOANGit is the growth rate of all ﬁnancial credits granted to ﬁrms for bank i. We
also control for bank size and type (i.e., commercial or savings) and for loan characteristics
(i.e., size, maturity, and collateral). Region, industry, and time dummies have been included.
*, **, and *** are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
of the borrowing ﬁrm, size and type of the bank lender, and, ﬁnally,
for size, maturity, and collateral of the loan granted.
We have also investigated if there is an asymmetric impact of
loan growth over defaults (columns 2, 4, and 6 in table 3). In good
times, when loan growth of each bank is above its average, we ﬁnd
a positive and signiﬁcant impact on future defaults (two, three, and
four years later). However, in bad times, with loan growth below the
bank’s average, there is no impact on defaults. Thus, this asymmet-
ric eﬀect reinforces the conclusions about too-lax lending policies
during booms.
To test the robustness of the former results, table 4 shows the
estimation of the model when the loan growth rate of the bank is
introduced without any comparison to its average value. The results
obtained are exactly the same: there is no eﬀect on the probability of
Vol. 2 No. 2 Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation 81
T
ab
le
4.
G
M
M
E
st
im
at
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
E
q
u
at
io
n
(2
)
U
si
n
g
a
R
an
d
om
E
ﬀ
ec
t
L
og
it
M
o
d
el
(L
oa
n
G
ro
w
th
R
at
e
of
B
an
k
In
tr
o
d
u
ce
d
w
it
h
ou
t
C
om
p
ar
is
on
to
It
s
A
ve
ra
ge
V
al
u
e)
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
C
o
eﬀ
.
S
E
C
o
eﬀ
.
S
E
C
o
eﬀ
.
S
E
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e
D
E
FA
U
LT
ij
t+
2
(0
/1
)
D
E
FA
U
LT
ij
t+
3
(0
/1
)
D
E
FA
U
LT
ij
t+
4
(0
/1
)
B
an
k
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
L
O
A
N
G
it
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0.
00
1*
**
0.
00
2
0.
00
1*
**
P
ro
vi
nc
e
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
du
st
ry
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o.
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
82
3,
65
6
1,
64
3,
70
8
1,
43
3,
07
4
T
im
e
P
er
io
d
19
85
–2
00
4
19
85
–2
00
4
19
85
–2
00
4
W
al
d
T
es
t
[χ
(2
)]
/p
-v
al
ue
8,
96
6
0.
00
4,
80
2
0.
00
2,
98
7
0.
00
N
ot
e:
D
E
FA
U
LT
is
a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
th
at
ta
ke
s
1
if
th
e
lo
an
is
do
ub
tf
ul
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
L
O
A
N
G
it
is
th
e
gr
ow
th
ra
te
of
al
l
ﬁn
an
ci
al
cr
ed
it
s
gr
an
te
d
to
ﬁr
m
s
fo
r
ba
nk
i.
W
e
al
so
co
nt
ro
l
fo
r
ba
nk
si
ze
an
d
ty
pe
(i
.e
.,
co
m
m
er
ci
al
or
sa
vi
ng
s)
an
d
fo
r
lo
an
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
(i
.e
.,
si
ze
,
m
at
ur
it
y,
an
d
co
lla
te
ra
l)
.
R
eg
io
n,
in
du
st
ry
,
an
d
ti
m
e
du
m
m
ie
s
ha
ve
be
en
in
cl
ud
ed
.
*,
**
an
d
**
*
ar
e
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
pe
rc
en
t,
5
pe
rc
en
t,
an
d
1
pe
rc
en
t
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
82 International Journal of Central Banking June 2006
default in t+2 and a positive and signiﬁcant one on the likelihood of
default in t + 3 and t + 4.
In terms of the economic impact, the semi-elasticity of the credit
growth is 0.13 percent for default in t + 3 (0.13 percent in t + 4),16
which means that if a bank grows 1 percentage point, then the like-
lihood of default in t + 3 is increased by 0.13 percent (0.13 percent
in t+4). If a bank was expanding its loan portfolio at one standard
deviation above the average rate of growth, the impact would be
1.9 percent (1.9 percent). Thus, the economic impact estimated is
low for the period analyzed and the sample considered, despite the
signiﬁcance of the variables.
All in all, the previous results show that in good times, when
credit is growing rapidly, credit risk in bank loan portfolios is also
increasing.
2.3 Collateral and Credit Growth
This section provides evidence of the behavior of banks in terms of
their credit policies along the business cycle. The argument so far
has been that too-rapid credit growth comes with lower credit stan-
dards and, later on, manifests in a higher number of problem loans.
Here, we provide some complementary evidence based on the tight
relationship between credit cycles and business cycles. We argue
that banks adjust their credit policies depending on the business-
cycle position. For instance, in good times, banks relax credit stan-
dards and are prepared to be more lenient in collateral requirements.
On the other hand, when a recession arrives, banks toughen credit
conditions and, in particular, collateral requirements.
If the hypothesis presented in the former paragraph is true, we
would have complementary evidence to support prudential regula-
tory policies. If it is true that, during boom times, loan portfolios are
increasingly loaded with higher expected defaults, then it should also
be true that other protective devises for banks, such as collateral, are
eroded.17 The following equation allows us to test the relationship
between collateral and economic cycle.
16The marginal eﬀect of the k-variable is computed as MEk = d[Pr ob(y=1|x¯)]dxk =
Λ(βˆx¯)[1 − Λ(βˆx¯)]βˆk. Then, the semi-elasticity is given by MEk/Average Default.
17It might also be the case that, during good times, banks decrease credit risk
spreads in their granted loans partially as a result of overoptimism and tight
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Pr(Collateralijklt = 1) = F (θ + αGDPGt−1
+β|GDPGt−1 − Average GDP| + Control Variablesijklt) (3)
A full description of model 3 and its control variables is in
Jime´nez, Salas, and Saurina (forthcoming). Here we only focus
on the impact of GDP growth on collateral, controlling for the
other determinants of collateral. The variable on the left-hand side
takes the value of 1 if the loan is collateralized and 0 otherwise.
j refers to the loan, i refers to the bank, k refers to the market,
l refers to the ﬁrm (borrower), and t refers to the time period (year).
We estimate equation (3) using a probit model. As control vari-
ables, we use borrower characteristics (i.e., if they were in default
the year before or the year after the loan was granted, their indebt-
edness level, and their age as a borrower), bank characteristics (size,
type of bank, and its specialization in lending to ﬁrms), character-
istics of the borrower-lender relationship (duration and scope), and
other control variables (such as the level of competition in the loan
market, the size of the loan, and the industry and region of the
borrower).18
The database used is the CCR. We focus on all new ﬁnancial
loans above e6,000 with a maturity of one year or more, granted by
any Spanish commercial or savings bank to nonﬁnancial ﬁrms every
year during the time period between December 1984 and December
2002. We exclude commercial loans, leasing, factoring operations,
and oﬀ-balance-sheet commitments for homogeneity reasons.
The ﬁrst column in table 5 shows the results of estimating
model 3 for the pool of loans, nearly two million loans. There is
a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between GDP growth rates
and collateral; that is, in good times banks lower collateral require-
ments, and they increase them in bad times. In terms of the impact,
the semi-elasticity of GDPG is −3.1 percent, which means that an
competition among banks. The opposite would happen in bad times, when bank
managers would tighten credit spreads. Unfortunately, our database does not
allow us to test this hypothesis.
18Jime´nez, Salas, and Saurina (forthcoming) contains a similar analysis on a
diﬀerent sample of loans and using a diﬀerent estimation procedure (i.e., ﬁxed
eﬀects).
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increase of 1 percentage point in GDPG reduces the likelihood of col-
lateral by 3.1 percent. In the bond market, Altman, Resti, and Sironi
(2002) ﬁnd evidence of a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between
the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD).
Focusing on the loan market, our results show that the positive cor-
relation between PD and LGD need not hold since—as the recession
approaches (and the PD increases)—banks take more collateral on
their loans, which might decrease the LGD.19
The cyclical behavior of banks regarding collateral is not sym-
metric. Column 2 in table 5 shows that the likelihood to pledge
collateral decreases proportionally more in upturns than it increases
in downturns, as the negative and signiﬁcant value of the parameter
of the absolute value of the diﬀerence between GDP rate of growth
and its average across the period studied points out (i.e., −0.092 in
upturns versus −0.058 in downturns). Despite the asymmetry, the
negative relationship between loan PD and LGD still might hold.
Moreover, from a prudential point of view, there are even more
concerns regarding the too-lax credit policies maintained by banks
during upturns.
Credit markets are segmented across borrowers and across matu-
rities. Therefore, it might be possible that the former aggregated
results do not hold for particular market segments. To carry out
this robustness exercise, the database is split into two groups: short
term (maturing at one to three years) and long term (maturing at
more than three years). A second classiﬁcation of the loans relates
to the experience of the borrower. One group of loans, labeled “old,”
contains those loans from borrowers about whom, at the time the
loan is granted, there is already past information in the database (for
instance, if they were in default the previous year). The other group
of loans, which we call “new,” is from borrowers obtaining a loan
for the ﬁrst time. Table 5 (columns 3–6) shows that, although there
are some diﬀerences across the maturity of borrowers and across old
and new borrowers, the main results hold. For old borrowers, the
impact of the business cycle on collateral policy is larger for long-
term loans than for short-term ones. We ﬁnd the same result across
new borrowers, but the magnitude of the decline in collateral as the
19We thank M. Gordy for pointing out this implication.
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economy improves is lower. For short-term loans—both old and new
borrowers—collateral requirements decline during upturns but do
not increase during downturns, either because the ﬁrm has no col-
lateral to pledge or because banks put in place other strategies to
recover their short-term loans.
3. A New Prudential Tool
The former section has shown clear evidence of a relationship
between rapid credit growth and a deterioration in credit standards
that eventually leads to a signiﬁcant increase in credit losses. Bank-
ing regulators, aware of this behavior and concerned about long-term
solvency of individual banks as well as the stability of the whole
banking system, might wish to implement some devices in order to
alleviate the market imperfection.
Borio, Furﬁne, and Lowe (2001) contains a detailed discussion of
procyclicality and banking regulator responses. There has been a lot
of discussion about the impact of capital requirements on the cyclical
behavior of banks.20 Here, we want to focus on loan loss provisions
since we think that they are the proper instrument to deal with
expected losses. Thus, we propose a new prudential provision that
addresses the fact that credit risk builds up during credit boom peri-
ods. This new provision is in addition to the already existing speciﬁc
and general provisions. The general provision can be interpreted as a
provision for the inherent or latent risk in the portfolio—that is, an
average provision across the cycle. The new loan loss provision (or
the third component of the total loan loss provision) is based on the
credit-cycle position of the bank in such a way that the higher the
credit growth of the individual bank, the more it has to provision.
On the contrary, the lower the credit growth, the more provisions
the bank can liberate from the previously built reserve. Analytically,
we can write
LLPtotal = specif.+ g∆C + α(∆C − γCt−1), (4)
20The issue of procyclicality of capital requirements has drawn a lot of atten-
tion (Dan´ıelsson et al. 2001, Kashyap and Stein 2004, and Gordy and Howells
2004, to name a few).
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where the total loan loss provision (LLPtotal) has three components:
(i) the speciﬁc provision (specif.), (ii) the latent provision (applied
on each new loan granted to cover the average credit risk, g), and
(iii) the countercyclical, or forward-looking, provision, where Ct−1
is the stock of loans for the previous period, γ is the average loan
growth rate across banks and across a lending cycle, and ∆C is the
absolute growth in total loans. Thus, when the loan portfolio grows
above the average historical growth rate, the provision is positive,
and it is negative otherwise.
Note that the provision is positive in boom periods and nega-
tive during recessions. The more distant the bank behavior is from
the total system, the larger the provisioning impact. The underlying
idea is quite simple: the more rapid the credit growth, the higher the
increase in market share and, presumably, following our empirical
results, the higher the credit risk assumed by the bank and, there-
fore, the higher the provision. The asymmetry found in some of the
results of the former section (see table 2) points toward an increase
in loan loss provisions in good times, when credit risk increases and
there is rapid credit growth, and allowing the previously built loan
loss reserves to be depleted in downturns, when the former rapid
credit growth materializes as loan losses.
Our proposal is a very simple and intuitive prudential tool to
cope with credit risk linked to cyclical lending policies. The provi-
sion is not expected to replace the existing provisions but rather
to reinforce them. Therefore, we would have speciﬁc provisions for
impaired assets already individually identiﬁed, plus provisions to
cover inherent losses in homogeneous groups of loans (i.e., losses
incurred but not yet identiﬁed in individual loans), as well as pro-
visions that take into account the position of the bank in the credit
cycle and, thus, its credit risk proﬁle.
The third component of LLPtotal, the countercyclical one, has
been considered in our proposal as an additional loan loss provi-
sion. Alternatively, it could be included in capital requirements (for
instance, asked through pillar 2 of the Basel II framework).21 Bank-
ing supervisors, according to their experiences regarding lending
cycles and credit risk, might ask banks to hold higher capital levels
21See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004).
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during booms in order to take into account future problem loan
developments. Note that this proposal might contribute to allevi-
ate potential concerns, if any, about increased capital procyclicality
within the Basel II framework.
3.1 Simulations
One way to understand the workings of the provision put forward
is through a simulation exercise. We simulate a full economic and
lending cycle in eleven years. During the ﬁrst two years, the econ-
omy is expanding at full steam, which means rapid credit growth
and very low speciﬁc loan loss provisions (as a result of low problem
loan ratios). From year 3 onward credit growth decreases and prob-
lem loans increase with a subsequent increase in speciﬁc provisioning
requirements. In year 6 the trough is reached with a maximum in
provisioning requirements and a minimum in lending growth. From
year 7 onward the credit and the economy recover and speciﬁc pro-
visions decline. Figure 1 shows the evolution of loan loss provisions
over total loans during the eleven years. The evolution of the spe-
ciﬁc provision plus the general (latent risk) provision (i.e., the ﬁrst
two parts of our provisioning formula (4)) is quite cyclical, with a
signiﬁcant rise around the trough period.
Regarding the third component of the total loan loss provision,
when loan growth rates are above the average loan growth rate
(i.e., the ﬁrst three years in our simulation), its amount is posi-
tive, charged in the proﬁt and loss account (P&L), and accrued in a
provision fund or reserve account. When loan growth starts to dip
below the average (between years 4 and 9), the amount is negative
and is accrued in the P&L from the previously built fund.22 From
year 10 onward the provision resumes a positive value (as a result
of a new expansionary credit cycle), and the fund is being built up
again.
What is the ﬁnal impact of the new provision over a frame-
work that already has a speciﬁc and a general provision? The total
loan loss provision is smoother than the sum of the speciﬁc and
22Of course, it is understood that the fund cannot be negative; that is, the
bank is not allowed to write as income in the P&L something that has not been
previously built up.
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Figure 1. Simulation Exercise: Loan Loss Provisions
as a Percentage of Total Loans
general provisions (ﬁgure 1). But the smoothing is far from total.
There is still quite a signiﬁcant variation of total loan loss provi-
sions across the credit cycle. Of course, during recessions provisions
reach the maximum amount, as the speciﬁc one dominates the land-
scape. However, in true boom periods (i.e., years 1 and 2) when
loan growth is extremely high, provisioning requirements through
the third component of the provision are signiﬁcant. The new pro-
vision is countercyclical, but it does not have a signiﬁcant impact
on total loan loss provisions unless the variability in credit growth
rates is extreme, which—for most of the banks—is not the case. At
the same time, the volatility of proﬁts is somewhat lower through
the cycle.
4. Policy Discussion
The empirical results of the former section provide a rationale
for countercyclical loan loss provisions, apart from those covering
impaired assets or the latent risk in the loan portfolio. However,
accounting frameworks do not fully recognize such a coverage. For
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instance, although from a prudential point of view there is a rationale
for setting aside provisions since the loan is granted, accountants are
reluctant to allow it.23
Since January 2005, all European Union ﬁrms (either banks or
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms) with quoted securities in any EU organized mar-
ket have to comply with International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS, formerly called International Accounting Standards,
or IAS). That means a change in the provisioning system based on
speciﬁc and general provisions. From 2005 onward, banks have to set
aside provisions to cover individually identiﬁed impaired assets; for
homogeneous loan portfolios, they will be required to cover losses
incurred but not yet identiﬁed in individual loans. IAS 39 does not
allow banks to set aside provisions for future losses when a loan is
granted. Therefore, the new standards do not perfectly match the
prudential concerns of banking regulators. Borio and Tsatsaronis
(2004) show a way to sort out this problem through a decoupling of
objectives (i.e., one is to provide unbiased information; the other is
to instill a degree of prudence). We believe a more fundamental ques-
tion is, what purpose should the accounting framework serve and,
more importantly, at what price? Financial stability concerns and,
therefore, prudent accounting should probably be higher on the list
of priorities, especially since there is overwhelming evidence of earn-
ings management. The incentives to alter the accounting numbers
will not disappear with IAS.24 If investors might not, in any case,
get the unbiased ﬁgures, there might be room for instilling prudent
behavior through the accounting rules.
Alternatively, if accounting principles are written in a way that
does not allow for sheltering prudential concerns, banking regula-
tors might try other devices in order to counterbalance the nega-
tive impact of excessive decreases in credit standards during boom
periods. For instance, pillar 2 of the new capital framework put for-
ward by supervisors in Basel II might include a stress test of capital
requirements that might be based along the lines developed here for
23That is not the case with insurance companies, where the technical provision
to cover the risk incurred appears just after the insurance policy has been sold
to the customer.
24For a theoretical rationale of income smoothing, see (among others)
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) and Goel and Thakor (2003).
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the new provision. In a sense, if the accounting framework does not
provide enough ﬂexibility to banking supervisors, they should ﬁnd
it through the allowed supervisory discretion of pillar 2.
Either as an additional provision or as a capital requirement, the
third component of total loan loss provisions will help to counter the
cyclical behavior of own funds in Basel II. Basel I was not properly
tracking banks’ risks. Basel II is meant to tie capital requirements
more closely to risk. Capital requirements will increase during reces-
sions as the probability of default increases. However, the evidence
provided in this paper argues that (ex ante) credit risk increases
during boom periods. Therefore, without interfering with Basel II
pillar 1 capital requirements, pillar 2 adjustment might help to take
into account those increases in ex ante credit risk and, somehow,
soften the procyclicality of capital requirements.25
Rajan (1994) discusses possible regulatory interventions that
would reduce the expansionary bias in lending policies—among
them, decreasing the amount of loanable funds or imposing credit
controls. However, both proposals do not seem very feasible since
they might have other negative, unintended consequences, as the
author recognizes. Alternatively, close monitoring of bank portfo-
lios by supervisors, and the corresponding penalties, might be the
answer. However, that will increase the cost of supervision substan-
tially. Our loan loss provision proposal is inexpensively monitored
and easily available for bank supervisors. Moreover, it is not designed
to curtail credit growth but to account for the negative impact of
too-lax lending policies. It is up to each bank manager to decide its
lending policy, but if the lending policy is reckless, loan loss provi-
sions should be proportionally higher to account for future higher
credit losses.
This paper also has some implications in terms of ﬁnancial infor-
mation disclosure and transparency. It is argued that more disclosure
of information by banks will help investors to discipline bank man-
agers and, therefore, to help banking supervisors as well. In fact, that
is the main rationale for pillar 3 of Basel II. However, some recent
research (Morris and Shin 2002) points toward a more-nuanced posi-
tion regarding the welfare achievements of more transparency and
25The loan loss provision we propose here might work as the “second instru-
ment” proposed by Goodhart (2005) to maintain ﬁnancial stability.
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disclosure and the above-mentioned widespread existence of earnings
management. In fact, Rajan (1994) ﬁnds what he calls a counterin-
tuitive comparative statics: “Allowing banks to fudge their account-
ing numbers and to maintain secret (sic) reserves can improve the
quality of their lending decisions.”
The new provision is fully transparent. Investors and, more gen-
erally, any bank stakeholder could “undo” its eﬀects since they only
need to look at the lending growth rate of the bank and the average
of the system. Of course, transparency could improve even more if
regulators make it compulsory to release the amount of the stress
provision in the annual report of each bank. Here, we are not try-
ing to manage earnings or, more precisely, to smooth banks’ income
through that provision. Instead, we are just trying to cope with
latent risks in bank loan portfolios in a way that is fully transparent
and not properly addressed by IAS or even Basel II capital require-
ments. In fact, it might be possible that our proposal could con-
tribute to a decline in income-smoothing practices across banks since
(at least partially) some of their causes would be covered by the new
provision. Thus, contrary to Rajan, banking regulators would have
no need to allow banks more discretion to “fudge” their accounts
since the regulatory framework would allow for an appropriate cov-
erage of latent risks in good times and a lower impact on the P&L
in bad periods that would result in a less volatile pattern for proﬁts
through the cycle.
Banco de Espan˜a has applied the so-called statistical provision
from mid-July 2000 onward. It is a countercyclical provision. When
the three currently existing loan loss provisions (i.e., speciﬁc, gen-
eral, and statistical) are added up through an economic cycle, the
quotient between total loan loss provisions and total loans remains
almost constant along time. Accountants did not ever like this total
smoothing eﬀect along the credit cycle. The new provision that
we have developed in this paper does not have those drawbacks.
First of all, the quotient between total loan loss provisions and
total loans shows a cyclical pattern (i.e., increases in bad times),
but that pattern is much less pronounced than before (ﬁgure 1).
From a prudential point of view, it is very important that total loan
loss provisions are relatively high in the peak of the lending boom.
Secondly, although total loan loss provisions are high in boom peri-
ods, the maximum is reached around the recession, when impaired
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assets are also at their maximum. Thus, loan loss provisions are not
completely smooth along the business cycle.
5. Conclusions
Increasing banking competition—coupled with agency problems,
strong balance sheets, and some other characteristics of banking
markets (such as risk-related capital requirements, imperfections in
the equity market, and maturity mismatches)—may bring about
lower credit standards that translate into too-expansionary credit
policies and, eventually, higher loan losses. Therefore, a bank regu-
lator concerned about the negative eﬀects of too-rapid credit growth
on individual banks’ solvency and on the whole stability of the bank-
ing system might use some prudential tools in order to curtail exces-
sive lending during boom periods and, by the same token (although
in the opposite direction), too-conservative credit policies during
recessions.
The empirical literature on the relationship between excessive
loan growth and credit risk is scant. The ﬁrst contribution of this
paper is to provide more precise and robust evidence of a positive,
although quite lagged, relationship between rapid credit growth and
future nonperforming loans of banks. Moreover, we also ﬁnd a direct
relation between the phase of the lending cycle and the quality and
standards of the loans granted. During lending booms, riskier bor-
rowers obtain funds, and collateral requirements are signiﬁcantly
decreased. Lower credit standards and a substantial lag between
decisions made on loan portfolios and the ﬁnal appearance of loan
losses point toward credit risk signiﬁcantly increasing during good
times. Therefore, credit risk increases in boom periods, although it
only pops up as loan losses during bad times.
The second contribution of this paper is to develop a loan loss
provision (i.e., a prudential tool) that takes into account the former
developments. The idea is that banks should provision during good
times for the increasing risk that is entering their portfolios and
that will only reveal as such with a lag. On the other hand, in bad
times banks could use the reserves accumulated during boom peri-
ods in order to cover the loan losses that appear but that entered the
portfolio in the past. Thus, we develop a countercyclical provision
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that is a direct answer to the robust empirical ﬁnding of credit risk
increasing in good times.
Accounting frameworks usually do not allow for countercyclical
provisioning—that is, for the coverage today of latent credit risk in
banks’ portfolios. Therefore, given the interest of supervisors in a
prudent coverage of risks, it might be possible to transform the for-
mer countercyclical provision into a capital requirement based on a
stress test included in pillar 2 of Basel II, the new regulatory capital
framework for banks. In doing that, those that have shown concerns
about increased procyclicality of Basel II might ﬁnd some help.
All in all, the paper combines theoretical arguments with robust
empirical ﬁndings to provide the rationale for a countercyclical loan
loss provision. The paper is a contribution to the intense debate
among supervisors and academics on the proper tools to enhance
ﬁnancial stability.
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